By Author: Predrag Nikolić (Monitor)
In May 2025, the Judicial Council and the Prosecutorial Council adopted new rules governing the system for evaluating judges and state prosecutors. The previous rules had not functioned effectively, and the first results of the new system are expected to become visible during this year. Experts praise the improvements while warning of numerous challenges, and judges are expressing dissatisfaction due to still unclear and, as they claim, discriminatory rules.
For years, the evaluation of judges and prosecutors was largely a formality, in which holders of judicial office were predominantly awarded the highest grades. The European Commission has long warned that this process should be based on measurable results. In its latest report on Montenegro (November 2025), the European Commission reiterated clear recommendations for further reform of the evaluation system in order to make it more efficient and strictly merit-based.
In May 2025, the Judicial Council and the Prosecutorial Council adopted new rules regulating the evaluation system for judges and state prosecutors. These new systems were presented as a significant step forward in establishing a transparent, fair, and merit-based process for assessing the work of judicial office holders.
A NEW SYSTEM STILL OPERATING THE OLD WAY
The new evaluation system has not yet fully taken hold. During 2025, only 20 judges were evaluated. Of these, 11 were assessed in promotion procedures, seven in regular evaluation procedures, and two as candidates for court president positions, according to data obtained by Monitor from the Judicial Council. The practice from previous years continued, with no negative evaluations issued: 12 judges received an “excellent” rating, seven were rated “good,” and one “satisfactory.” No evaluations were conducted for Supreme Court judges during 2025.
The Judicial Council, chaired by Radoje Korać, explains that the evaluation of judges is conducted to assess their expertise, quality of work, ethical standards, and need for professional development, as well as for promotion purposes.
Unlike the judiciary, no evaluations were conducted within the prosecution service last year. The Prosecutorial Council, chaired by Supreme State Prosecutor Milorad Marković, explained that this was due to objective reasons:
“Amendments to the Law on the State Prosecutor’s Office changed the criteria and sub-criteria for evaluating prosecutors’ performance, which required the adoption of new Rules on Evaluation of State Prosecutors and Heads of Prosecutor’s Offices, entering into force on 27 May 2025. The mandate of the Prosecutorial Council members expired on 5 August 2025, and new members from among distinguished legal professionals were elected on 19 November 2025. Consequently, it was not possible to establish the Evaluation Commission or adopt an Evaluation Plan earlier, which is why evaluations of prosecutors were halted during 2025.”
FAILED STRATEGIES
Proclaimed guidelines from earlier judicial reform strategies—that the selection, promotion, and accountability of judges and prosecutors are fundamental guarantees of judicial independence—have largely failed, according to domestic NGOs and experts.
“The previous system was marked by excessive formalism, a focus on statistical indicators, and an almost complete absence of substantive assessment of work quality. Criteria were unclear and often allowed arbitrary interpretation, while explanations of evaluations were brief or stereotypical. Such an approach did not encourage professional development nor serve as an effective tool for strengthening accountability,” lawyer Boris Marić told Monitor.
The inadequacy of the system is illustrated by data showing that between 2016 and 2021, out of 116 prosecutors working in special, basic, and higher prosecutor’s offices, as many as 115 received the highest rating—“excellent”—while only one was rated “good.” Similar practice continued in 2022, with slight changes only in recent years.
Pilot evaluation projects in the judiciary also failed. For example, in 2017, half of the judges at the Basic Court in Nikšić received unsatisfactory ratings due to lack of professional training and insufficient participation in “various professional activities.” In some cases, judges rated “excellent” in all other criteria received an overall “good” rating due to lack of training.
The then President of the Supreme Court, Vesna Medenica—who also chaired the Evaluation Commission—repeatedly announced reforms in evaluation.
REPORT BY THE AGENCY FOR PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION
Even after Medenica’s departure and prosecution, things did not significantly improve. In March 2022, the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (APC), then headed by Jelena Perović, submitted an opinion to the Special State Prosecutor’s Office stating that the retroactive application of amendments to evaluation rules—adopted by the Judicial Council on 6 August 2021—undermined the public interest and could compromise the integrity of the Council.
The APC forwarded the document for assessment of whether a criminal offense had been committed, noting that some judges’ ratings had been altered under the new rules, enabling their promotion.
The Judicial Council, then chaired by Vesna Simović-Zvicer, responded that it would inform the Agency of its position, although it maintained that assessing the legality of such acts falls outside APC jurisdiction.
At the time, the Evaluation Commission was chaired by Vesna Vučković, with members Vladimir Novović, Ana Perović-Vojinović, Dragan Babović, and lawyer Loro Markić.
Some media reported that, based on “adjusted” evaluations, the Judicial Council selected judge rapporteur Seka Piletić—known for overturning the 2016 attempted terrorism verdict—as a candidate for the Supreme Court.
Piletić was elected to the Supreme Court in March 2022. A year later, the APC concluded that her appointment violated regulations, endangered the public interest, and could undermine the integrity of the Judicial Council. She retired in July 2025.
Meanwhile, the Special State Prosecutor’s Office initiated criminal proceedings against former APC director Perović for several offenses, including abuse of office and document forgery.
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In addition to formalistic evaluations, disciplinary proceedings were also ineffective. Rare cases typically ended with symbolic penalties—salary reductions of 20–40 percent for a few months.
One example is special prosecutor Saša Čađenović, disciplined in 2012 with a 15% salary reduction for three months for improperly taking over a case and issuing an unauthorized decision.
In 2022, he was indicted for forming a criminal organization and abuse of office, accused of collaborating with the “Kavač clan” and obstructing prosecutions.
Since the establishment of the Prosecutorial Council, no prosecutor has been dismissed. An earlier dismissal decision from 2013 was overturned.
Some judges and prosecutors avoided disciplinary proceedings by resigning beforehand.
One of the rare disciplinary cases involved High Court judge Suzana Mugoša, sanctioned with a 30% salary reduction and a two-year promotion ban for alleging corruption in a court ruling.
A long-running disciplinary case against judge Nataša Bošković, initiated in 2014, was ultimately dismissed in May 2025 after a Constitutional Court ruling.
CLEARER AND STRICTER INDICATORS
The Judicial Council explained to Monitor that the main innovations in the evaluation process, compared to previous ones, lie in the introduction of different criteria and sub-criteria applied in assessing the efficiency of judges’ work, the quantity and quality of their work, the quality of reasoning in decisions, and similar aspects. Judges are now evaluated every five years, as opposed to the previous system where evaluations were conducted every three years.
According to the Prosecutorial Council, the new Rules on Evaluation establish clearer and stricter indicators for assessing both criteria and sub-criteria of performance. They explain that the sub-criterion relating to the quality and quantity of work consists of a total of ten indicators, each scored individually, after which a final grade for this sub-criterion is determined in accordance with Article 12 of the Rules.
“The evaluation system has also been improved through the introduction of a new algorithm within the information system of the Secretariat of the Prosecutorial Council, which allows, for each year under evaluation, the selection of cases by random sampling to serve as the basis for assessing the work of a state prosecutor,” the Prosecutorial Council explained.
Marić states that the new rules represent a step forward compared to the previous system, primarily because they are more precise in formal terms and attempt to introduce clearer criteria and benchmarks for evaluating the work of judicial office holders. He also considers it positive that, at least at the normative level, greater emphasis is placed on consistency of practice and transparency of the evaluation process. However, he stresses that their actual impact will depend on how they are applied in practice and on the willingness of the councils to implement them consistently and without selectivity.
He points out that serious challenges still remain: “It is particularly concerning that some criteria are still broadly defined and leave room for subjectivity. Additionally, it is not sufficiently clear how ethics, integrity, and professional standards are to be assessed in practice, nor is there a clear mechanism for harmonizing evaluations across different commissions or councils.”
At Human Rights Action (HRA), which has been monitoring this issue for years, it is assessed that the new rules represent progress, but that certain shortcomings persist.
“Although the evaluation of Supreme Court judges is now prescribed, the same still does not apply to state prosecutors in the Supreme State Prosecutor’s Office. There is no justified reason for these prosecutors to be exempt from evaluation, as monitoring their work is equally important—this is also a recommendation of the Venice Commission,” Amra Bajrović, legal advisor at HRA, told Monitor.
She adds that, although the work of state prosecutors is now evaluated in relation to decisions of the Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights, such a criterion has not been предусмотрен for judges.
“Additionally, we believe that when assessing the quality of a state prosecutor’s work, consideration should be given to the number of accepted or rejected motions for ordering and extending detention, the number of upheld complaints against decisions to dismiss criminal charges, as well as final judgments of regular courts.
We continue to emphasize the need that, in every case where the statute of limitations for criminal prosecution occurs, the reasons for this should be examined, that any potential responsibility of the competent judge or state prosecutor should be determined by a commission, and that, if such responsibility is established, it should have a direct impact on the evaluation of their work,” Bajrović stressed.
Marić believes that the key issue will be whether the new system will lead to a genuine distinction between high-quality and low-quality work and to strengthening public trust in the judiciary: “This will be particularly evident through monitoring the sustainability of judgments and indictments, as well as the consequences if these legal acts prove unsustainable in 30 percent or more of cases.”
“It will also be important to monitor the work of expert commissions within the councils that will carry out the evaluation process. At the same time, although a step forward has been made, there was not enough professional courage on the part of the councils to include integrity checks of judges and prosecutors in this process, to further elaborate these criteria, and to make a clear contribution to what is publicly known as vetting,” Marić concluded.
According to the evaluation plan for judges for this year, the Judicial Council has предусмотрed that all judges who do not have an established evaluation from the previous period will be assessed. In addition, evaluations will be conducted for judges appointed for the first time after three years in office, judges without prior evaluations who are applying for promotion, as well as judges applying to the Administrative and Commercial Courts. Judges who previously received a “does not meet expectations” rating will also be re-evaluated.
As no evaluations were conducted last year, the Prosecutorial Council announced that the evaluation process for state prosecutors and heads of prosecutor’s offices under the new Rules would begin in February of this year.
UNCERTAINTIES REGARDING THE NEW RULES
Tanja Vidić, Acting President of the Basic Court in Cetinje, told Monitor that evaluations under the new rules have not yet begun.
She notes that the new rules have modified the criteria relating to the sub-criterion of work quality, and believes that these changes will largely contribute to higher ratings, as this sub-criterion directly depends on the number of cases handled by a court.
“However, this sub-criterion is not a true measure of the quality of work in courts with a large caseload, both in terms of cases in progress and those subject to appeal. For example, if appeals are filed in 200 cases and 15 decisions are overturned, that amounts to 7.5 percent. In smaller courts, there are fewer appealed cases due to a lower inflow—so if 15 out of 100 cases are overturned, that is 15 percent. It is therefore clear that this is merely a matter of statistics, and by no means a genuine indicator of a judge’s work quality,” Vidić explains.
She adds that evaluation is not regulated solely by the Rules on the Evaluation of Judges and Court Presidents, but also by the Law on Judges and the Judicial Council. She points out that certain ambiguities remain, which may lead to situations where “a judge who receives a ‘satisfactory’ rating is placed in an unequal position, as they are barred from promotion for the next five years—the period until the next regular evaluation—while a judge whose work is rated ‘unsatisfactory’ may be eligible for promotion after just one year.”
DISCONTENT IN THE SPECIAL DEPARTMENT
At the beginning of March, part of the media reported that judges of the Special Department of the High Court in Podgorica had addressed the Judicial Council, requesting to be exempted from the evaluation system.
Criticism voiced by the President of the Supreme Court, Valentina Pavličić, at a session of the Judicial Council was also reported: “Last year in February, we appointed eight judges to the Special Department, and out of those eight, in a year we have perhaps two cases adjudicated,” said the President of the Supreme Court.
Pavličić announced that Supreme Court judges, once they begin reviewing the work of the Special Department, would “fully adhere to those guidelines”: “Let them complain when we start evaluating them,” she emphasized.
The High Court responded, with judges of the Special Department explaining that they had repeatedly appealed for the specificities of not only this department but others as well to be taken into account during evaluation, all with the aim of ensuring objective assessment of all judges. They referred to previously submitted proposals by High Court judges, as well as individual suggestions and remarks made by judges of this court during the adoption of earlier evaluation rules—submitted in line with recommendations of the Venice Commission and Council of Europe experts—which were not accepted.
In earlier comments submitted to the Judicial Council by 11 judges of the Criminal Department of the High Court in Podgorica, it was stated that the evaluation rules are not in line with EU standards and that their application would lead to serious problems in practice. They explained that they fear that the most competent judges would receive lower ratings due to the evaluation methodology.
In remarks recently submitted to the Ministry of Justice, High Court judge Goran Šćepanović explained that cases involving organized crime, corruption, money laundering, various forms of serious crime, and other grave criminal offenses are objectively the most complex. “A single such case, in terms of complexity, scope, and duration, is equivalent to dozens of ‘regular’ cases. However, under the current criteria, a judge of the Special Department of the High Court in Podgorica who completes five such cases is evaluated the same as a judge who completes five simple cases (e.g., petty theft, minor bodily injury…),” Šćepanović stated.
He warned that this could lead to demotivation among these judges, the risk of receiving an “unsatisfactory” rating even when working at an exceptionally high level, unequal treatment of judges, and could also incentivize avoidance of complex cases—since a judge seeking a good evaluation has an interest in handling simpler cases with a lower risk of decisions being overturned. Šćepanović proposed that special evaluation criteria be applied to judges of the Special Department, taking into account the objective complexity of the cases within their jurisdiction.
“Judges must be equal before the law and within the evaluation system. Applying the same criteria to a judge handling minor offenses and to one conducting multi-year proceedings against organized criminal groups does not constitute equal criteria,” Šćepanović concluded.
In remarks submitted by judges of the Criminal Department of the High Court in Podgorica, it is noted that in Croatia, for judges handling organized crime and war crimes cases, there is no numerically defined norm regarding quantity, nor is quality assessed in the same way as for other judges—as is the case under our law and rules. Instead, judges are evaluated using specific sub-criteria: “Here, particular attention is given to each individual case a judge handles, in terms of its complexity, scope, number of defendants, etc., which we consider entirely justified.”
In their response, judges of the Special Department of the High Court in Podgorica stated that they would propose amendments to the existing Rules in line with European standards—which are already evolving—arguing that the current Rules are evidently flawed and contrary to the recommendations of the Venice Commission, and that they should follow the evaluation system applied in Croatia.
“This is because we believe that the existing Rules discriminate against a certain category of judges and represent a direct attack on their independence, which is why, to our knowledge, they are also subject to review before the Constitutional Court,” the judges of the Special Department of the High Court stated in their response
CONDITION FOR CLOSING CHAPTER 23
Shortly before the judges of the Special Department voiced their objections, the Judicial Council announced that it had adopted a decision to amend the rules on the evaluation of judges in line with the recommendations of the Venice Commission.
The main criteria emphasized by the Venice Commission for the evaluation of judges and prosecutors include professional competence, integrity and ethics, efficiency and quantity of work, assessment of the quality of work, and continuous professional development. It also insists on the removal of political influence, primarily by ensuring that the Minister of Justice does not participate in the work of the Judicial Council in order to avoid political pressure.
In order to meet this requirement, the Government, in mid-February, adopted a proposal for amendments to the Constitution of Montenegro that would change the composition and method of selecting members of the Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils. The amendments provide that the Minister of Justice will no longer be a member of these bodies, that judges elected by all judges will form the majority in the Judicial Council, and that non-judge members will be selected based on professional references and integrity, according to objective and measurable criteria. The proposed changes to the Prosecutorial Council foresee that members from among distinguished legal experts will be elected by a qualified majority.
All of this follows the recommendations of the European Commission, which insists on greater transparency of the Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils, particularly in the publication of detailed, well-reasoned decisions on promotions, appointments, and disciplinary proceedings. The Commission has also emphasized the need to avoid formalism in evaluation and to ensure that the process truly reflects professional integrity and efficiency, rather than merely statistical data on the number of cases resolved. The European Commission has further pointed out that the track record in establishing accountability for judges and prosecutors remains limited, and that the system must be stricter regarding violations of ethical codes and professional duties.
The announced changes are driven by the need to close Chapter 23 in Montenegro’s EU accession negotiations, with the aim of bringing the Montenegrin judiciary closer to the level of accountability and professionalism found in EU member states.
(The article was produced within the project “Open Trials – Monitoring Cases of High Corruption and Organized Crime,” jointly implemented by the Center for Monitoring and Research (CeMI) and the Media Union of Montenegro, with the support of the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The views expressed in the article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the donors.)
